We investigate the security design problem in an initial public offering (IPO). In line with Rock (1986), we consider a situation in which some investors are better informed than others about the prospects of the firm, resulting in a winner's curse problem. To raise capital, the owners of the firm must underprice the securities they issue in order to compensate the less informed investors for their willingness to participate in the issue. In this context, we first show that firms can sometimes lower the cost of going public by using unit IPOs, in which equity and warrants are combined into a non-divisible package. Because warrants are less sensitive to low cash flow realizations, unit IPOs tend to be valuable to firms that face large downside risks or whose uncertainty revolves around the eventual performance of their assets in place. Second, we show that firms may be able to completely eliminate the winner's curse problem by making the warrants callable. Such a first-best scenario is possible when a firm's growth potential is sizeable even in bad states of the world, as the callability feature of the warrant allows the firm to dynamically create payoffs that are insensitive to the investors' private information. Our theory is consistent with the prominent use of unit IPOs and produces empirical implications that differentiates it from existing theories. * We thank Roger Edelen and Richard Kihlstrom for their comments and suggestions. All remaining errors are the authors' responsibility.
Introduction
The winner's curse problem in initial public offerings (IPOs) is well-known. As described by Rock (1986) , the potential presence of investors who are better informed than others implies that lesser-informed investors tend to end up with a larger (smaller) allocation of shares when the issue is overpriced (underpriced) . Anticipating this possibility, uninformed investors require a lower price to subscribe to the issue in the first place. This discount and associated reduction in proceeds is costly to the firm, as empirically documented by Koh and Walter (1989) , Keloharju (1993) , Michaely and Shaw (1994) , and numerous authors following them. 1
Although the winner's curse problem is well-understood, efforts by financial economists to find solutions that minimize its negative impact on new issues have been limited. 2 Our paper serves to fill this gap by studying how optimally designed securities can limit, and possibly even eliminate, the amount of money that new issuers must leave on the table to ensure the success of their offering.
Our solution comes in the form of package offerings consisting of an appropriate mix of equity and warrants that cannot be sold separately to new investors. These packages are similar to the unit offerings which, according to Schultz (1993) and Jain (1994) , are used in 15-20% of IPOs in the United States. 3 In our model, the information held by informed outside investors concerns the eventual distribution of the firm's future value. This information can be related to various aspects of value. For example, investors may have better information about the profitability of the firm's future investment (i.e., the firm's growth potential), the future performance of the firm's existing assets, or the firm's liquidation values in the event that the firm goes bankrupt. As such, uninformed investors face a winner's curse problem with respect to the firm's upside potential, its downside risk, or both.
In this context, our paper establishes two main results. First, we show that the value of including some warrants as part of the firm's IPO depends on the sensitivity of these securities to the investors' private information relative to that of equity. More specifically, because warrants pay off only when the firm realizes some of its growth potential, the value of these securities is less sensitive than that of equity for low realizations of firm value. Thus, when the informed investors' 1 See Ritter and Welch (2002) for an excellent survey of the literature on IPO underpricing and IPOs in general.
2 Some exceptions, and how they relate to our paper, are discussed below.
3 The use of warrants in IPOs is not unique to firms in the United States. For example, the use of warrants in IPOs is also prevalent in Israel (Hauser and Levy, 1996; Kandel, Sarig and Wohl, 1999) and Australia (How and Howe, 2001; Lee, Lee and Taylor, 2003) . information concerns mainly the firm's downside risk and/or the eventual performance of its assets in place, uninformed investors are less at an informational disadvantage when warrants are included in the IPO. This reduces both the negative effect of the winner's curse and the firm's cost of going public.
This reduction of the winner's curse problem is not perfect however. Indeed, like the payoff of equity-only IPOs, the payoff of unit IPOs is strictly increasing in the firm's eventual value, and so the winner's curse problem can never be fully eliminated by packaging standard warrants with equity. 4 The paper's second main result shows that this can be fixed by considering warrants that are callable by the firm before they expire. This is because the possibility for the firm to force early exercise allows it to dynamically create securities whose payoffs are not as valuable in high states of the world. More precisely, we show that the firm can generate the first-best outcome by properly designing the call characteristics of the warrants that it includes in the IPO. Intuitively, by choosing an appropriately large trigger value for calling the warrants, the firm commits to force their early conversion only when the firm's (interim) value is consistent with positive information held by informed investors. By setting the warrants' strike price so that the payoff from this early exercise of the option is low, the firm is sometimes able to dynamically create a security whose eventual payoff is insensitive to the investors' private information at the time of the IPO. This happens if the firm's potential profitability in the bad states of the world, even though lower than in the good states, is large enough for the option of these warrants to be positive. When that is the case, the inclusion of a large enough number of callable warrants completely eliminates the winner's curse problem and yields the first-best outcome.
Several authors study the security design problem of a firm that has some information that investors do not have. For example, Nachman and Noe (1994) derive the conditions under which the resulting adverse selection problem is minimized by issuing debt, thereby generalizing Myers and Majluf's (1984) results on the tradeoff of debt and equity when a lemons problem exists. DeMarzo and Duffie's (1999) approach to a similar problem revolves around the firm's tradeoff between the cost of retaining cash flows and the liquidity loss that comes with issuing securities that are sensitive to the firm's information. Rahi (1996) shows that the optimally designed security reveals the firm's information to the investors through a rational expectations equilibrium. Finally, Boot and Thakor (1993) , and Fulghieri and Lukin (2001) analyze the problem of a firm that must take the information production of investors into account in its choice of securities. The security design problem that we study differs from that in these papers in that we focus on a situation in which the firm is potentially less informed than some of the investors. 5
In this respect, our paper is more closely related to the paper by Parlour and Rajan (2005) who, following Rock's (1986) lead, study an IPO problem in which investors are differentially informed. 6 In their model, all investors are imperfectly informed about the value of the stock, but a winner's curse problem exists because their information is potentially different when they bid for the firm's shares. This creates a role for the firm to commit to rationing before the IPO as a second-best solution. On the one hand, rationing is costly in that the highest bidder does not get the full equity allocation; on the other hand, rationing benefits the firm by reducing the investors' concern about the winner's curse and by making them more aggressive in their bidding on average.
Our model, like Rock's (1986) model, assumes that the winner's curse manifests itself through ex post state-dependent rationing that hurts uninformed investors. The fact that we establish that optimal security design can reduce the extent of the winner's curse problem makes Parlour and Rajan's paper and ours complementary. Indeed, when first-best cannot be achieved via a properly packaged set of securities, the use of committed rationing rules will allow the firm to get closer to a full elimination of the winner's curse and allow it to maximize the proceeds from the issue.
Like us, Chakraborty and Yılmaz (2002) and Axelson (2005) study security issuance problems when some investors are better informed than others, and consider the possibility that some informationally sensitive claims are optimal depending on the source of the information asymmetries that exist across potential investors. Our paper is different in that neither of these papers considers the use of callable warrants in the security design problem and neither's solution recovers the first-best scenario. Furthermore, both papers find debt financing to be optimal, and so their results are not readily applicable to the study of IPOs. Finally, in another related paper, Garmaise (2001) analyzes the security design problem of a firm faced with investors who have different but rational beliefs. 7 He finds that issuing informationally sensitive claims (e.g., equity) becomes more attrac-tive to firms as the number of investors with varying optimism who bid on the claims increases, as such claims then maximize the diversity of opinions and, as a by-product, the value that the most optimistic investor attaches to the claims. Besides the fact that we use the stronger concept of rational expectations and that we allow callable warrants to be issued, our paper differs from his in the role that security design plays: it reduces the winner's curse in ours, while it motivates information acquisition in his.
To our knowledge, only two theories have been advanced for the use of warrants in IPOs. Schultz (1993) argues that unit IPOs serve the same purpose as staged equity financing in venture capital (e.g., Sahlman, 1990 ). The idea is that, by providing the firm with a series of capital infusion, unit offerings reduce the agency costs associated with free cash flows (e.g., Jensen, 1986 ). Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) argue that the inclusion of warrants in IPOs helps risk-averse insiders signal the high quality of their firm when outcomes are risky. The idea is that risk-averse entrepreneurs wishing to diversify their position value the risky high-state payoffs less than investors and so warrants that pay only in those states provide a cheaper way to signal firm quality than underpricing (e.g., Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989) or equity retention (e.g., Leland and Pyle, 1977) .
Like these other two theories, our model predicts that young, small and risky firms will tend to include warrants in their IPOs. Our prediction about risk, however, is a little sharper than that of these other theories, as it is downside risk and asymmetric information about that risk that prompts firms to include warrants in their IPOs. As such, for the same total firm risk, only firms whose assets in place are riskier will tend to use unit IPOs. For example, firms with intangible assets and firms that are heavily invested in research and development (R&D) are predicted to include warrants in their security offering when they first go public. Of course, for the downside risk to matter and create a potential winner's curse problem, this risk has to be significant. This is why our model also predicts that firms using unit IPOs will tend to subsequently go bankrupt more often and more quickly than firms that go the equity-only route.
In our model, the presence of existing debt affects the downside risk at the time of the IPO.
As such, the inclusion of warrants will be affected by the firm's financing prior to the IPO. In particular, low levels of unsecured debt are unlikely to affect the balance between downside risk and upside risk, but high levels of debt mean that existing debtholders already absorb a large portion of the downside risk. As a result, we predict that unit IPOs are more likely to be used by that allows agents to hold different beliefs (or priors) but requires these beliefs to conform to the data. firms with low levels of existing debt.
Our model yields additional testable implications regarding the characteristics of the warrants that firms will include in their IPOs. First, our optimality result about the callability of warrants is new to the IPO literature, as neither Schultz (1993) or Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) consider the possibility that the packaged warrants are callable. Second, we show that the inclusion of callable warrants makes unit offerings optimal when the option value of the firm is significant even after negative shocks. This will be the case if these firms' operations are volatile, and especially so in downturns. In fact, because warrant options can be quite valuable to investors in bad times, firms will tend to include a higher proportion of warrants (relative to shares of equity) in their IPO packages in an effort to balance the value of these packages in subsequent good and bad states of the world and, as a result, reduce the negative effects of asymmetric information across investors on the proceeds of the offering. Finally, our model shows that the warrants that are most efficient in reducing the winner's curse problem are characterized by low call prices and high exercise prices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up our basic model, which we then analyze in Section 3. This last section also studies the effect of existing debt on the optimal IPO solution. In Section 4, we generalize the model to accommodate the possibility for the firm to make the warrants callable. We show that this often allows the firm to fully eliminate the winner's curse problem and to recover the first-best scenario. The empirical implications of the model are discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 summarizes and concludes. All the proofs are contained in Appendix A.
The Model Setup
Consider a three-date economy in which the riskless rate is zero and all agents are risk-neutral. At time t = 0, an all-equity firm privately owned by an entrepreneur must raise some capital through an initial public offering (IPO) in order to undertake a new project. 8 More specifically, the firm seeks to raise C > 0 in capital, the initial cost of the project. 9 The firm's total cash flows, from both the firm's existing assets and the new project, are denoted by V . The IPO takes place at t = 0. At that time, the potential investors in the IPO are differentially informed about the likely distribution of V , giving rise to a winner's curse problem that is costly to the firm. At time t = 1, 8 In Section 3.1, we consider the effect of existing debt on our results.
9 Equivalently, the firm's existing shareholders want to cash out an amount C of their shares for exogenous reasons.
investors in the IPO trade their securities in efficient financial markets. Finally, at time t = 2, the cash flows are realized.
The uncertainty about the firm's prospects is captured by two states of nature, s = 2 and s = 1, that occur with probability λ ∈ (0, 1) and 1 − λ respectively. In state s, V is equal to H s with probability φ s ∈ (0, 1) and to L s with probability 1 − φ s , where H s > L s > 0. We assume that the cash flows in state s = 2 first-order stochastically dominate those in state s = 1. That is, we assume that H 2 ≥ H 1 , L 2 ≥ L 1 and φ 2 ≥ φ 1 , with at least one strict inequality. Also, we denote the expected value of V in state s by
As one interpretation of this setup, we think of L s as the state-s value of the firm's assets in place at time t = 2. Then, H s −L s is the potential payoff of the growth opportunity associated with the new project, and φ s H s −L s its expected value. We assume that the new project has a positive net present value and is worth undertaking in both states of the world, that is, φ s H s − L s > C for s = 1, 2. This implies, that in a first-best scenario without any information asymmetries, the firm will raise C and invest in the project regardless of the state of the world, with the choice of securities irrelevant for shareholder welfare. However, as we show, when potential investors are differentially informed about the state s at t = 0, the choice of securities will matter.
We assume that a subset of outside investors learn the state of the world s at t = 0 with probability µ > 0, while the firm and all the other outside investors do not. Although some uncertainty remains through φ s , the informed investors' knowledge of s allows them to identify and stay away from overpriced issues, as in Rock (1986) . The nature of their informational advantage depends on the value of the parameters that describe payoffs. For example, when H 1 = H 2 and φ 1 = φ 2 , their informational advantage revolves around the profitability of the firm's existing assets and is measured by L 2 − L 1 . Similarly, when L 1 = L 2 and H 1 = H 2 , their information is about the viability of the new project. Finally, when L 1 = L 2 and φ 1 = φ 2 , they know more about the potential scale of the new project. One can also think of s as the state of the industry upon which the firm's future profitability depends. That is, state s = 2 (s = 1) represents an industry that is likely to perform well (poorly), but the success of any one firm is still affected by idiosyncratic factors, as captured by φ 2 (by φ 1 ). We will return to these and other interpretations in later sections when we discuss the empirical implications of our model.
Given a price at which the firm offers the issue, each investor decides whether or not to subscribe.
Since some investors are potentially informed, other uninformed investors face a winner's curse problem in doing so. Uninformed investors are more likely to obtain a larger allotment when informed investors choose not to subscribe to the issue, i.e., exactly when the true value of the claims sold is not worth the price given the informed investors' information. In order to guarantee the success of the IPO, the firm is then forced to underprice the issue in order to mitigate this winner's curse problem facing uninformed investors. Such underpricing imposes a deadweight loss on the existing stake-holders in the firm. We wish to characterize the set of securities that minimizes this cost. 11
We assume that the set P of feasible securities available to the firm consists of any package of equity and call warrants. Given that the firm is initially all-equity financed, a share α ∈ [0, 1) of equity entitles investors to cash flows of αV when total firm cash flows equal
the additional equity share that the packaged warrants entitle investors to upon paying an amount X per warrant (for a total exercise price of βX), the additional cash flows from the warrants is given by β max{V −X, 0}, where max{V −X, 0} is the payoff from each warrant. The total cash flow from the package is denoted by P (α, β, X) = αV + β max{V − X, 0}. 12 We denote the expected value of a warrant with an exercise price of X given a state s = 1, 2 by w s (X) = E max{V − X, 0} | s , and summarize the set of feasible packages of equity shares and warrants available to the firm by
The set P is constrained to include only packages with a minimum numberᾱ > 0 of shares, wherē α can be made arbitrarily close to zero. This assumption is made purely for realism purposes, as no firm ever goes public by issuing warrants only, the reason (e.g., liquidity, cost of issue, etc.) being outside the model. Frequently, this constraint will not bind for the optimal package. The constraint on X states that the warrants are non-trivial while the constraint α + β ≤ 1 states that at most the entire firm may be sold. Since our main objective is to contrast standard IPOs (that include only equity) with unit IPOs (that include equity and warrants in a single package) in terms 11 To be sure, if these costs are severe enough, the firm may decide to design an IPO that fails with some probability, a possibility of underinvestment and associated deadweight costs that we ignore in this paper. To ensure that underinvestment is suboptimal for the firm, it is enough to assume that the project's net present value in state s = 1 is large enough relative to µ. 12 We adopt this particular accounting convention in order to be able to treat the equity share α separately from the additional share β the warrant-holders are entitled to. Notice that the payoff of any package P (α, β, X) ∈ P is increasing in the underlying cash flows V . Since the firm's total cash flows in state s = 2 stochastically dominate those in state s = 1, this implies that the expected value of the claims issued is always higher conditional on s = 2 than on s = 1, leading informed outside investors to stay away from the issue in state s = 1 but to subscribe to it in state s = 2. In other words, the issue is more likely to be oversubscribed in state s = 2. As a result, uninformed investors whose subscription choice cannot depend on s (as it is unknown to them) are more likely to be allocated the issue in state s = 1: they suffer from the winner's curse in that state. From their perspective, the effective probability that state s = 2 occurs conditional on being allocated the issue is smaller than the unconditional probability λ of that state occurring. We denote this effective probability by θ < λ, where θ close to zero (to λ) corresponds to a large (small) winner's curse problem for uninformed investors. Since the firm can only invest if the issue succeeds, it designs the issue to ensure that uninformed investors are willing to subscribe and break even by paying C. It is then necessary that the expected value of the claims sold under the conditional beliefs θ, denoted byP θ , must equal the required outlay C. But then the true (unconditional expected) value of the claims sold,P λ , derived from the prior beliefs λ, will typically exceedP θ = C. The differenceP λ −P θ ≥ 0 is then the (ex ante) expected informational cost to the firm associated with the package P . 13 In the next section we characterize the package P ∈ P of equity and non-callable warrants that minimizes this cost, while in Section 4 we expand the set P to include warrants that are callable in order to characterize securities that may even eliminate these costs.
Optimal IPOs with Non-Callable Warrants
To minimize the costP λ −P θ that the winner's curse imposes on its offering, the firm must choose the package P ∈ P that has the lowest payoff sensitivity to the private information held by informed investors at time t = 0. Lemma 1 characterizes the exact condition under which this is achieved by a unit IPO as opposed to a standard IPO. For more economic intuition, we state this condition in terms of simple, but fictitious, debt claims written on the firm's final cash flow. With a face value F ≥ 0 of debt, such a claim pays off min{F, V } at time t = 2, and we denote its expected value in
Lemma 1 The unit IPO strictly dominates the standard IPO if and only if there exists
The intuition for this result is as follows. A call warrant can be thought of as levered equity whose value depends on upside cash flows. If the debt to value ratios are ordered such that
for all F , then the equity to value ratios are ordered in the reverse direction, that
. In such cases, the asymmetric information about expected cash flows on the upside (affecting the winner's curse cost of warrants) is more severe than that involving overall -downside and upside -cash flows (that affects the winner's curse cost of equity). Thus the firm favors a standard IPO that consists entirely of equity. If however,
for some F > 0, then warrants with a strike price equal to F will lower the overall winner's curse cost, as less money now has to be raised via equity. As such, the firm then prefers to issue a package of equity and warrants, with the optimal mix depending on the distribution of cash flows. 
When H 1 ≤ L 2 , the informational advantage of the informed investors is monotonic in the sense
Any security package that offers a larger fraction of its payments for outcomes above H 1 will therefore come with a larger information rent for the investors and will be more expensive for the firm. The package that minimizes this fraction is the equity-only package, that is, it is optimal for the firm to have a standard IPO.
In the more interesting case with H 1 > L 2 , the informational advantage of the informed investors is no longer monotonic as Pr
decreases and φ 1 increases (recall that we must still have φ 2 ≥ φ 1 ), the informational advantage of the informed investors gets smaller. In that case, it is possible that a package offering a larger fraction of its payments for V ∈ L 2 , H 1 to dominate the standard IPO. The package that offers the largest fraction of payments in this interval is the one that includes warrants with an exercise price of L 2 . Including these warrants is only optimal if (2) does not hold, that is, when (fictitious) debt with face value F = L 2 is more sensitive to the investors' information about the state of the world than a warrant with an exercise price of X = L 2 . Indeed, the left-hand side of (2) is the ratio of this debt's value in state s = 2 over that in state s = 1, while the right-hand side of (2) is the ratio of the warrant's value in these two states.
It is clear from Proposition 1 that the firm will issue warrants when H 2 is not much larger than H 1 and φ 2 is not much larger than φ 1 , as the right-hand side of (2) is then close to one while the left-hand side stays above one. Still, in order to further the intuition, we specialize the results for some specific distributional assumptions in a series of corollaries that follow directly from Proposition 1. In all of these corollaries, we focus on the case where 14 In Appendix B, we provide the analogue of Proposition 1 for continuous distributions.
In this case, investors do not have any informational advantage as far as the cash flows below L are concerned. Indeed, a promised debt payment of F = L would be repaid with probability one in both states of the world, and so the left-hand side of (2) is equal to one in this case. Because the right-hand side of (2) is always above one, it is better for the firm to issue as few claims that are informationally sensitive to V being above L as possible. This is achieved by issuing equity only. 
When the firm's upside potential is known to be H, the decision to include warrants in its IPO revolves around the relative size of the firm's assets in place in the two states of the world.
When L 1 and L 2 are close, learning the state of the world does not provide investors with much downside information, and so issuing warrants, which are informationally sensitive to the firm's upside potential (as captured by the size of φ 2 relative to that of φ 1 ), is suboptimal. However, when learning the state of the world removes a great deal of uncertainty about assets in place, issuing claims that less sensitive to this information is valuable, and so unit IPOs become attractive to the firm. The reason for this last result is similar to that for Corollary 2. When φ approaches one, information about assets in place (i.e., L 1 vs. L 2 ) is irrelevant, as the high cash flows are likely to be realized. Thus claims that are sensitive to downside information can be issued without much of an informational rent, and this is why issuing only equity is better for the firm. When φ is small however, the uncertainty revolves primarily around assets in place, as high cash flows do not get realized frequently in either state of the world. Claims that are sensitive to the downside are then expensive as they come with a large informational rent. As such, the firm is better off including warrants in its IPO.
The Effect of Existing Debt
We now turn to the possibility that the firm already has outstanding debt of face value F 0 ∈ (0, H 2 ) and that this debt is senior to any new claim issued by the firm. Because the current bondholders are promised the first tranche of F 0 out of the firm's total cash flows at time t = 2, this existing debt affects the size of the cash flows that are available to new investors and, as we show, the tradeoff between standard and unit IPOs.
Our first result looks at the case where the debt is risky in both states of the world, that is, F 0 > L 2 and so the firm can only possibly afford its debt when V = H s is realized. 
When the existing debt is riskless, more of it can only make the inclusion of warrants in the IPO more advantageous to the firm. This is because increasing the existing riskless debt increases the sensitivity of the downside cash flows to the informed investors' information. Indeed, as F 0 increases from zero to L 1 , the ratio of assets in place that are available to investors in state s = 2 over state s = 1,
up to infinity. This makes securities that are not sensitive to downside risk, like warrants, more appealing. Notice from (the proof of) Lemma 3 and Proposition 2 that it is possible for a standard IPO to be preferable to a unit IPO for low and high levels of existing debt, while a unit IPO is preferred for intermediate levels of existing debt. This is because the information risk about the assets in place increases and dominates the tradeoff as F 0 increases. However, once F 0 increases above L 1 , it is the information risk of the upside potential of the firm that comes to dominate the tradeoff, as existing debt eliminates more and more of the downside cash flows.
Proposition 2 There exists a cutoff F
* ∈ (L 1 , L 2 ],
Optimal IPOs with Callable Warrants
So far, we have characterized optimal IPOs ignoring the possibility that the warrants may be callable. In this section, we expand the set of feasible securities P by including this possibility. To be precise, we assume that the firm may reserve the right to call back each warrant at a pre-specified unit call price k ≥ 0 (for a total price of βk) from any time on or after t = 1, provided the value of the firm at that date (equivalently, the stock price) exceeds a threshold value ν. As we discuss in
Section 5, such call provisions are frequently seen in practice. We use the term callable unit IPO in what follows in order to distinguish a unit IPO involving callable warrants from one where the warrants are non-callable.
Call provisions may have value because we assume that the securities are publicly traded at time t = 1 in efficient financial markets. Specifically, the market price of any traded security at t = 1 is equal to the expect payoff of that security given state s. The length of time between t = 0 and t = 1 can be thought of as the time it takes for the private information about the firm to get aggregated into market prices. 15 In such a case, the call provisions on the warrant can be designed such that the firm will be able to call the warrants and force the investors to exercise them at date t = 1 when the state is s = 2. In contrast, in state s = 1, the call restrictions will be such that the firm will not be able to force conversion and the warrant holders will hold onto the valuable options.
At t = 0, the subscribers to the IPO rationally anticipate that they will end up holding only equity whenever s = 2, and equity plus warrants whenever s = 1. Furthermore, since the warrant is less likely to be extinguished via a forcing call when s = 1, the expected equilibrium value of the warrant at t = 0 is higher conditional on s = 1 than on s = 2. That is, the warrants are more likely to be valuable exactly when the equity claims are less so. As we show below, this may be exploited to make any variation in the expected values of equity and warrant components to exactly offset each other, so that the total value of the package does not depend on s. This eliminates the winner's curse problem and the need for underpricing.
To understand more clearly the call and exercise decisions facing investors at date t = 1 when 15 In reality, because the securities included in the IPO start trading separately immediately after the IPO, the assumption amounts to one in which informed traders quickly push prices to their efficient level through their trading. The risk neutrality of investors and market-clearing at time t = 1 are sufficient to achieve this. Our qualitative results depend only on the assumption that the date 1 market prices are sufficiently (and not necessarily perfectly) informative about the differential information held at t = 0. market prices reveal the state s = 1, 2, notice first that the warrants are worth more to investors alive than dead since w s (X) ≥ V s − X. 16 As a result, investors will not want to exercise the warrants early unless the firm forces them to do so by calling the warrants, i.e., unless V s − X ≥ k, surrendering the warrants for the call price otherwise. On the other hand, the firm will want to call the warrants only when they are worth more dead than alive to the firm, that is, the firm will prefer to call whenever w s (X) ≥ k and not call otherwise. To prevent the firm from extinguishing option values, the callable warrant contract specifies that the manager cannot call to force exercise unless the market value of the firm is higher than the trigger value ν. The value of a callable warrant at time t = 1 in state s is then given by w s (X) if V s < ν or w s (X) < k, and by max{V s − X, k} otherwise. Our next result identifies a general necessary and sufficient condition for a package of equity and callable warrants to completely eliminate the negative impact on value of information that is differentially held across investors.
Proposition 3 A callable unit IPO eliminates any loss from the winner's curse (i.e., achieves first-best) if and only if
Proposition 3 shows that the firm will take advantage of the call provision to force exercise when good news arrives to the market at time t = 1. This allows it to make the overall offering package less sensitive to informational differences across investors, and to eliminate all winner's curse costs, whenever the upside potential of the firm, as measured by w 1 (V 2 ), is large enough.
In general, there can be multiple packages of equity and callable warrants that fully eliminate the winner's curse. However, Proposition 3 also pins down a unique contract that achieves first-best over the largest set of parameter values relative to other possible efficient contracts. As shown in the proof, this contract is given by
With this contract, the warrants are called by the firm to force exercise at time t = 1 when s = 2.
When this happens, the warrants are at the money and the call price is negligible so that the investors are left holding equity only. In contrast, when s = 1, the call restrictions prevent the firm from forcing investors into exercising or surrendering their warrants. As such, the investors keep holding a package of equity and warrants. Given this equilibrium behavior at time t = 1, the expected value of the contract given s = 1 is seen, using (4), to be αV 1 + βw 1 (V 2 ) = C, while that given s = 2 is seen to be αV 2 = C as well. Since the expected value of the contract equals C regardless of s, informed investors do not have any informational advantage over uninformed investors, eliminating the winner's curse costs completely.
When condition (3) does not hold, no package of equity and callable (or non-callable) warrants can achieve first-best. Nonetheless, including callable warrants of the type specified by (4) can still reduce the winner's curse problem. This is the object of our next result.
Proposition 4 A callable unit IPO dominates a standard (or unit) IPO if w
The intuition behind this result is similar to that underlying the previous. Whenever the firm's upside potential is large enough in state s = 1 (in the precise sense that 
Empirical Implications
In this section we present and discuss the empirical predictions that our model yields. Some of these predictions are consistent with existing empirical evidence, and we do mention the appropriate references in those cases. The other predictions are novel, and they should provide a way not only to assess the validity of our model but also to test it against the theories advanced by Schultz (1993) and by Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) . The first four implications are derived from our results in Section 3 on non-callable warrants, while the last four implications are derived from our results in Section 4 on the value of call provisions and other warrant characteristics.
Proposition 1, along with Corollary 1 and Corollary 2, implies that a firm is more likely to include warrants as part of its initial offering of publicly traded securities when there is substantial uncertainty about downside values (i.e., when L 2 exceeds L 1 by a large enough amount). As discussed earlier, in our model, H s − L s corresponds to the value created by the firm's investment in successful projects, and L s corresponds to the value of the firm's existing assets. Since the uncertainty about a firm's assets is likely higher for firms with intangible assets, we have the following prediction.
Implication 1 Firms with intangible assets are more likely to use unit IPOs than other firms.
The evidence provided by Schultz (1993) seems to support this prediction. Indeed, he finds that unit IPOs are rarely used by firms in the mining, transportation, construction and retail industries.
On the other hand, unit IPOs seem to be highly favored by firms in business services (which include computer software), engineering, health services and personal services. Similar evidence that unit IPOs tend to be used by firms in service-oriented and high-technology industries is provided by Jain (1994) , by Lee, Lee and Taylor (2003) and by Garner and Marshall (2005) . Also supporting this prediction is the evidence provided by Garner and Marshall (2005) that firms whose asset return volatility is higher, issue a larger number of warrants per share as part of their unit IPO.
In other words, these firms avoid issuing securities whose cash flows are sensitive to the value of assets in place as much as possible.
For the uncertainty about downside values to matter, it has to be the case that there is a sizeable chance that these downside values (i.e., L 1 and L 2 ) occur for a given firm. That is, as we show in Corollary 3 with φ 1 = φ 2 ≡ φ, it has to be the case that φ is low (so that Pr{V = L s } is large) for a unit IPO to be optimal. If low cash flows are associated with firms sometimes going bankrupt, then we should expect firms that use unit IPOs to be less likely to survive following the issue.
The empirical evidence provided by Garner and Marshall (2005) appears to be consistent with this prediction. However, it is also worth mentioning that Jain (1994) finds that, after controlling for size, risk and underwriter reputation, the survival rate between the two groups is similar.
Implication 2 Firms that use unit IPOs are more likely to go bankrupt than the firms that use standard (equity-only) IPOs.
In Proposition 2, we find that firms with low levels of risky debt are more likely to include warrants in their IPOs. This is because some uncertainty remains about the portion of firm value that belongs to equity holders in the low states of the world, since the firm may not be bankrupt in all such states. Lee, Lee and Taylor (2003) and Howe and Olsen (2006) provide evidence that indeed unit IPOs are used by firms with less outstanding debt than regular IPOs.
Implication 3 Firms with low levels of unsecured debt use unit IPOs more than firms with high levels of unsecured debt.
The relationship between IPO underpricing and post-IPO liquidity is studied by Booth and Chua (1996) and by Ellul and Pagano (2006) . In the former, underpricing is used to attract investors and the liquidity that their trading subsequently creates. In the latter, the expected lack of liquidity in the after-market causes the underpricing as investors demand a larger reward for holding illiquid stocks (e.g., Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1996; and Datar, Naik and Radcliffe, 1998) . Although unit IPOs reduce the effect of the winner's curse at the time of the issue, they do not eliminate information asymmetries in the post-IPO market.
In particular, shares and warrants are unbundled and start trading separately right after the IPO.
Since some investors are still likely to be better informed than others, the un-pooling of the two securities should translate into post-IPO trading that is different from that for equity-only IPOs.
In particular, these unresolved information asymmetries will likely lead to larger bid-ask spreads and lower liquidity. Similarly, the distribution of first-day stock returns for unit and regular IPOs should look different. For example, underwriters of unit IPOs are less likely to be able to offer price support in the after-market and, as a result, we should see a larger dispersion of first-day returns, that is, a less truncated distribution (see Ruud, 1993; and Hanley, Kumar and Seguin, 1993) .
Implication 4 The after-market for the equity in unit IPOs will be characterized by larger bid-ask spreads, lower liquidity, and more volatile first-day returns.
We now turn to the empirical predictions of our model that come from the callability feature of the warrants, as described in Propositions 3 and 4. In particular, these propositions establish that callable warrants are especially useful when warrants retain some option value even in the bad states of the world, that is, when w 1 (V 2 ) is large or at least positive. Since options are more valuable when the volatility of the underlying asset is large, we have the following prediction.
Implication 5 The warrants included in unit IPOs are more likely to be callable when the volatility of the firm's cash flows and overall performance increases with negative shocks or in down markets.
Because the callability of warrants does not play a role in Chemmanur and Fulghieri's (1997) model and is not affected by conditional volatility in Schultz's (1993) model, this prediction is novel.
Also, although Schultz (1993) documents that the majority of warrants in unit IPOs are callable (87% of his sample), no information is provided about the determinants of the callability decision of issuing firms. As such, this prediction remains to be tested.
Our second prediction concerns the number of warrants to be included in the IPO package.
Although we do not demonstrate this formally, it is easy to verify, using (4), that the ratio of warrants to shares of equity that are included in the issue, β α , decreases with V 1 , and increases with V 2 . As such, large differences in the firm's performance in good and bad states, as proxied by unconditional volatility, is likely to lead the firm to include more warrants in its IPO. Furthermore, it is easy to verify that β α is increasing in C, and so we would expect firms that raise more capital at the time of their IPO to include more warrants in their securities offering.
Implication 6 A larger ratio of warrants to shares of equity are included in the unit IPOs of firms with high idiosyncratic volatility and firms that sell a larger portion of their value when they first go public.
Again, little existing empirical evidence can be used to assess the validity of this prediction.
The one exception is the work of Garner and Marshall (2005) who find that the proportion of firm value sold as warrants increases with the firms' riskiness and with the ratio of warrants to equity shares in the unit IPO package. Because these findings are consistent with the signaling hypothesis underlying Chemmanur and Fulghieri's (1997) model however, they cannot be taken as exclusively supportive of our model.
The last direct implications of our model relate to the call and exercise prices (k and X) of the warrants included in the IPO. First, as discussed in the discussion following Proposition 3 and as shown in (4), the call price that makes the equity-warrant package efficient in most scenarios is zero, and so we would expect the call price that firms set for their warrants to be low. As far as we know, only Schultz (1993) provide any evidence on this front, and he finds that the average warrant call price is quite low, at about $0.05 per warrant.
Implication 7
The call price that firms set for the warrants included in their IPO is predicted to be low.
Finally, as discussed earlier, the exercise price of the warrants must be large enough so that the option's payoff to investors is not so large when the firm forces conversion. Again, this is consistent with the evidence provided by Schultz (1993) that the exercise price is more than 25% above the IPO's price per share. Looking at (4), X increases with V 2 , and so we also expect the exercise price of the warrant to be larger for firms whose growth potential is extreme is some states of the world, another prediction that has yet to be tested.
Implication 8
The exercise price of the option is predicted to be large relative to the stock price at the time of the issue, and it is expected to be larger when the firm's growth prospects are large.
Conclusion
When some investors possess information about the prospect of a firm that other investors do not possess, a winner's curse exist at the time the firm decides to go public. In particular, uninformed investors are more likely to receive shares when informed investors know something negative about the firm and stay away from the new issue. To protect themselves, the uninformed investors require a discount in order to participate in the issue, and this is costly to the issuing firm. To resolve this problem, our model proposes a security design approach which allows firms to pool warrant options along with equity shares in the security offering. As we show, the inclusion of warrants becomes advantageous when the downside risk of the firm is large and subject to information asymmetries across investors. More than that, the presence of warrants in the IPO package sometimes allows the firm to eliminate the winner's curse altogether. For this to be possible, the firm must make the warrants callable in high states of the world and it must be the case that the warrants are still valuable in low states of the world. Indeed, this combination removes the monotonicity of the packaged securities as a function of the firm's eventual value, and lowers the effective informational advantage of informed investors down to zero.
Our model considers the possibility that the issuing firm has some private debt outstanding and shows how this can affect its choice of financing at the time of the IPO. However, it does not consider the possibility of pooling a debt issue with the firm's IPO, as this is never done by firms in the United States. 19 Still, the use of debt could improve the firm's security design when the inclusion of warrants in IPO units is either insufficient to eliminate the winner's curse 19 Some of the Israeli IPOs in the sample used by Kandel, Sarig and Wohl (1999) pool debt along with the new equity issue.
problem or simply unfeasible for other exogenous reasons. Indeed, because debt contracts are less sensitive to information asymmetries related to the firms' upside potential, it will be the case that firms with high downside risk and potentially large information asymmetries across investors for downside value issue public equity before they issue public debt. Interestingly, this result has been empirically documented in a recent paper by Berkovitch, Gesser and Sarig (2006) . More precisely, in their sample of firms who access the public market for financing, 23% of them do so via a public debt issue as opposed to a public equity issue. They also find that these firms have a higher asset base and invest less in R&D, both consistent with lower downside risk and lesser potential information asymmetries across investors.
Although our theory is explained in the context of an IPO, its point is more general. Indeed, any situation in which financing is subject to the winner's curse problem can be approached from a security-design perspective. For example, this could be the case for an entrepreneur seeking private financing from a venture capital firm (VC). The asymmetric information problem then arises from the fact that any one VC does not know whether it was approached before the other VCs by the entrepreneur. A VC that is approached second is clearly at a disadvantage since, presumably, the first VC passed on the deal for a reason, i.e., the prospects of the firm are not as good conditional on the fact that the first VC decided not to finance. Because of this possibility, VC firms should demand a discount on their shares of the firm, unless an appropriately chosen set of securities can be put together in one financing contract. As we show in this paper, the option features embedded in the securities included in these contracts may affect their effectiveness in solving the winner's curse problem.
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Our qualitative results hold for general distributions that are ordered in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. We make this explicit in the proofs to follow by assuming that Φ 2 (v) ≤ Φ 1 (v) for all v ∈ [0, ∞) (with a strict inequality for a subset of strictly positive measure), where Φ s is the (right-continuous) cumulative distribution function associated with state s = 1, 2. We use this more general assumption and notation in the proofs of Lemma 1 and Propositions 3 and 4.
Also, in Appendix B, we present an extension of Proposition 1 for the case of general continuous distributions.
Proof of Lemma 1
Take any package P (α, β, X) = αV + β max{0, V − X} ∈ P. For any random variable Ω that depends on V , we denote the expected value conditional on state s = 1, 2 as Ω s ≡ E Ω | s and the unconditional expected value under probability q = θ, λ, asΩ q ≡ qΩ 2 + (1 − q)Ω 1 . Since any issue must be valued at C by uninformed investors in order to guarantee the investment in the new project, we must have
From the firm's perspective, however, this package is worth αV λ + βw λ (X) > C at the time of the issue, as the probability of state s = 2 is then λ > θ. The difference represents the informational rent R captured by the informed investors which, using (5) to replace α, is given by
Since the optimal package must minimize this informational rent, the choice between a regular IPO (that has β = 0) and a unit IPO (that has β > 0) depends on the sign of
In particular, the regular IPO is preferred if and only if this expression is positive for all possible exercise prices above zero, that is if and only if
for all X > 0. Simple algebra and the fact that λ > θ shows that this inequality is equivalent to
This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 1
We know from Lemma 1 that, for the unit IPO to strictly dominate the standard IPO, it is necessary and sufficient to find an F ∈ (0, H 2 ) such that
Let us first consider the case in which
This in turn implies
that the standard IPO dominates the unit IPO, as
without ever decreasing as F increases from zero to H 2 . This completes the proof for the case where H 1 ≤ L 2 . Accordingly, we focus on the case in which H 1 > L 2 for the rest of
which is an increasing function of F . Notice next that, for F ∈ L 2 , H 1 , we have
which is strictly negative if and
or, equivalently, if and only if
Thus d(F ) is either entirely non-decreasing or entirely non-increasing for
non-decreasing in this interval, then it is non-decreasing for all F ∈ (0, H 2 ) and so, using the same
for all F ∈ (0, H 2 ). As such, for the unit IPO to strictly dominate the standard IPO, it is necessary that d(F ) be non-increasing in the interval L 2 , H 1 . Indeed, it is necessary that the local maximum of
which is necessary for the unit auction to strictly dominate the standard auction. The sufficiency of this last inequality for the unit auction to strictly dominate the standard auction follows directly from Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 2
If the face value of the existing debt is F 0 > L 2 , then from the perspective of new investors, the firm's cash flows in state s are L s ≡ 0 or H s ≡ H s − F 0 , with probability 1 − φ s and φ s respectively. As such, using the notation (and strategy) introduced in the proof of Proposition 1, 
Proof of Lemma 3
If the face value of the existing debt is F 0 < L 1 , then from the perspective of new investors, 
Since the left-hand side of this expression is monotonically increasing in F 0 , the inequality becomes more difficult to satisfy as F 0 increases, and so unit IPOs become more attractive.
Proof of Proposition 2
This result follows directly from Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, the intermediate value theorem and continuity.
Proof of Proposition 3
Sufficiency. We show that if (3) is satisfied, one can construct a callable unit IPO that achieves first-best. Consider a package P (α, β, X) of equity and callable warrants with a call price of k and a trigger value ν ∈ (V 1 , V 2 ). Then the manager can call the warrants at time t = 1 if and only if s = 2. Suppose that k = 0 = V 2 − X so that, when s = 2 at time t = 1, the warrant is at the money and the warrant holders exercise if the warrant is called. Furthermore, set α and β such that the value of the (optimally exercised and called) package in each state is equal to C, that is, αV 2 = C, and (7)
Such a contract, if it exists, has no information rents associated with it, since the expected value of the security equals C, state by state. We look for conditions which guarantee existence. To this end, note first that the solution to (7) and (8) 
Because V 2 > V 1 (by the first-order stochastic dominance of Φ 2 (·) over Φ 1 (·)), it is clear that β > 0.
It just remains to show that β ≤ 1 − α, or that
as required by the definition of P. This last inequality is equivalent to (3).
Necessity. Suppose that a package P (α, β, X) ∈ P together with call provisions {k, ν} achieve first-best, with α ∈ (ᾱ, 1), β ∈ [0, 1 − α], and X > 0. Because equity-only financing (i.e., β = 0) cannot eliminate the winner's curse problem, it must be the case that β is strictly positive. We proceed in steps.
Step 1: The warrants are called if and only if s = 2, that is, ν ∈ (V 1 , V 2 ).
By first-order stochastic dominance, it is immediate that the first-best cannot be achieved if (i) the warrants are never called, or (ii) the warrants are always called and always turned in (unexercised), or (iii) the warrants are always called and always exercised. If the warrants are always called, and they are sometimes exercised and sometimes turned in, then they will be exercised when s = 2 (requiring that V 2 − X ≥ k) and turned in when s = 1. To achieve first-best, we need αV 2 + β(V 2 − X) = C, and
However this is impossible, since V 2 > V 1 (by first-order stochastic dominance) and V 2 −X ≥ k ≥ 0.
We conclude that the warrants will be called at time t = 1 if and only if s = 2, that is, we have
Step 2: Without loss of generality, k ≥ V 2 − X.
We show that for any first-best package with a warrant strike price that satisfies k < V 2 − X, then there exists another package that also achieves first-best, that differs only in the call price k, and satisfies k ≥ V 2 − X. To see this suppose that V 2 − X > k ≥ 0 so that the warrants are exercised when called in state s = 2. Since first-best is achieved, we must have αV 2 + β(V 2 − X) = C, and
Consider another warrant contract that differs only in the call price, which is set at k = V 2 − X.
Clearly, with such a contract, the warrant holders are indifferent between exercising their warrants and turning them into the firm unexercised. Also, the contract achieves first-best as it satisfies αV 2 + βk = C, and (9)
together with the constraints that
Thus, without loss of generality, the contract can be such that warrant holders weakly prefer to surrender the warrants when called, and such that it satisfies (9)-(12).
Step 3: Without loss of generality, k = 0.
Notice first that it must be the case that k < w 1 (X). For if k ≥ w 1 (X), since α, β > 0 and V 2 > V 1 , we cannot then have (9)-(10) hold. We show next that if k > 0 in a package that achieves first-best, then there exists another package that also achieves first-best with k < k. To see this, suppose that k > 0 in a package that achieves first-best. From (12) and β > 0, we have α, β ∈ (0, 1). Furthermore, from (9) and (10), we have β > 0 which in turn implies that α < 1.
Consider a differential change in k of amount dk < 0, together with changes in X, α and β, such that dX = −dk > 0, and further, (9) and (10) continue to hold, i.e., V 2 dα + k dβ + β dk = 0, and (13)
where w 1 (X) ≡ dw 1 (X) dX ∈ (−1, 0). Since dX = −dk, the second inequality in (11) will continue to hold after the change. We need to guarantee that second one in (12) also does, i.e., that dα+dβ ≤ 0.
Using dX = −dk in (13)- (14) and solving for dα and dβ in terms of dk, we obtain dα + dβ = β (V 1 − w 1 (X)) + w 1 (X)(V 2 − k) V 2 w 1 (X) − V 1 k dk.
Since dk < 0, β > 0, V 2 > V 1 and w 1 (X) > k, it follows that dα + dβ ≤ 0 if and only if V 1 − w 1 (X) ≥ −w 1 (X)(V 2 − k).
But this follows from observing that V 1 − w 1 (X) = D 1 (X) ≥ (1 − Φ 1 (X))X = −w 1 (X)X and, from the second inequality in (11), that X ≥ V 2 − k. This concludes step 3.
Step 4: It must the case that (3) is satisfied.
Since, without loss of generality, we have k = 0 (from step 3) and k ≥ V 2 − X (from step 2), it follows that X = V 2 . Using this in (9), we have α = C V 2
. Thus, for (10) to hold, it is necessary that
holds for some β ∈ 0, 1 − C V 2
. Clearly, since V 2 > V 1 , the left-hand side of (15) is strictly smaller than C at β = 0. Since the left-hand side of (15) is monotonic in β, a necessary condition for it to hold is that the right-hand side of (15) be larger than C at β = 1 − C V 2
. That is, it is necessary that
which is equivalent to (3). This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4
If (3) holds, then we know from Proposition 3 that callable unit IPOs achieve first-best and so the result trivially holds. So suppose instead that (3) does not hold and that w 1 (V 2 ) > 0. We show that a standard IPO is dominated by package that includes callable warrants. The proof for the unit IPO is entirely analogous and so is left out.
Consider a package with P (α, β, X) ∈ P that has k = V 2 − X = 0, ν ∈ (V 1 , V 2 ). Since (3) does not hold, such a package does not achieve first-best, and so it must satisfy αV 2 = C + δ 2 , and αV 1 + βw 1 (V 2 ) = C − δ 1 , for some δ 1 > 0 and δ 2 > 0. The informational rent paid by the firm (and captured by the informed investors) are then given by
At the same time, since the issue raises C in capital for the firm, we must also have
Notice that if β = 0, such a package reduces to a straight equity issue. Consider a change to an equity-warrant package by increasing β from zero to a positive value, and adjusting α downwards so that (16) continues to hold. Then we have dα dβ < 0, and so
Appendix B: Continuous Distributions
In this section we present and prove the analogue of Proposition 1 for the case where (i) cash flows are continuously distributed with support on [0, ∞) and (ii) the warrants are non-callable (i.e., the feasible set of securities is given by P). To this end, let r(v) = 1−Φ 2 (v) 1−Φ 1 (v) denote the odds ratio. This means that can be interpreted as a case where the information asymmetry is more about downside values. 20
